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Abstract 
 
The South African customary land tenure system is currently 
administered in terms of the Interim Protection of Informal Land 
Rights Act 31 of 1996 (IPILRA). As the name suggests, this is a 
temporary measure to protect vulnerable customary land rights 
while awaiting permanent communal land tenure legislation. In 
terms of section 2(1) of the IPILRA, no person may be deprived 
of any informal right to land without his or her consent. This 
provision is subject to subsection (4) of the IPILRA, the 
Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 or any other law that provides for 
the expropriation of land rights. Accordingly, section 2(4) states 
that no one may be deprived of his or her informal rights in land 
unless it is through the Expropriation Act, any valid land 
expropriation legislation or through custom that is endorsed by 
a majority of the community members. 
Nevertheless, the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) and 
mineral right applicants habitually contravene this consent 
provision by not including the beneficiaries of the IPILRA in the 
mineral right application process. The DMR awards licences 
without the consent of communities because the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) 
authorises it to act as the custodian of mineral resources on 
behalf of all South Africans. When an application for mineral 
rights is received, it is the DMR's duty as a custodian to ensure 
that all the requirements of the MPRDA have been complied 
with. These levels of engagement, consent under the IPILRA 
and consultation in terms of the MPRDA, form the basis of the 
analysis of the decision of Baleni v Minister of Mineral 
Resources. Although the court decided that the acceptable level 
of engagement is consent in terms of the IPILRA, this article 
argues that consultation and consent are not mutually exclusive, 
and hence require reading the two pieces of legislation together. 
Keywords 
Customary land rights; consultation; consent; custodianship; 
Xolobeni community. 
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1 Introduction 
Patterns of land ownership and interests in land in South Africa are to a 
great extent remnants of the racial discrimination that characterised the 
South African apartheid regime.1 During apartheid, black people were 
prevented from owning or occupying land in particular parts of South Africa.2 
Soon after apartheid, the Constitution,3 followed by other pieces of 
legislation, essentially sought to remedy the injustices of the apartheid 
regime. The advent of constitutional democracy introduced a new era in 
which black South Africans could occupy any land in South Africa. 
The Constitution recognises the injustices of the past and honours those 
who suffered for justice and freedom in South Africa.4 In terms of section 
25(9) of the Constitution, Parliament is mandated to enact legislation that 
gives effect to section 25(6), which in turn provides that any person or 
community whose tenure in land is legally insecure due to apartheid laws 
and practices is entitled either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress. Currently, South African customary land rights are 
informal. Thus, in the absence of permanent legislation to safeguard 
customary landholding, the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act5 
(hereinafter the IPILRA) fills this gap. As the name suggests, this is a 
temporary measure to protect customary land rights and other informal land 
                                            
  Mpho Tsepiso Tlale. LLB (National Univ of Lesotho) LLM (NWU) LLD (NWU). Post-
doctoral Research Fellow, Department of Public Law, Stellenbosch University, South 
Africa and the South Africa Research Chair in Property Law (SARCPL). The 
SARCPL is funded by the South African National Department of Science and 
Technology, administered by the National Research Foundation (NRF) and hosted 
by Stellenbosch University. The financial assistance of the NRF is hereby 
acknowledged. Opinions expressed are those of the author and are not attributable 
to the NRF. Special thanks to ZT Boggenpoel (Chair SARCPL) and the rest of the 
team for reading through previous drafts of this manuscript, and for your unending 
support. Email: tlale.mpho@yahoo.com. 
1  Pienaar Land Reform 85-86; Terreblanche History of Inequality in South Africa 25; 
Kloppers and Pienaar 2014 PELJ 681; Hoffman 2014 J South Afr Stud 707; 
Claassens 2014 J South Afr Stud 762. 
2  Pienaar Land Reform 82-83; Mostert, Pienaar and Van Wyk "Land" 1-21; Kloppers 
and Pienaar 2014 PELJ 681; Hoffman 2014 J South Afr Stud 707. This article 
acknowledges the influence of colonialism on landholding patterns in South Africa, 
but an accurate analysis of earlier history in this context has already been dealt with 
extensively by Pienaar Land Reform ch 3; Terreblanche History of Inequality in 
South Africa 25. 
3  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
4  Preamble to the Constitution. 
5  Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 (IPILRA). 
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rights.6 Section 2(1) of the IPILRA provides that no person may be deprived 
of any informal right to land without his or her consent.7 
Equally, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act8 (MPRDA) 
was introduced in 2004 as the new minerals and petroleum legislation. The 
MPRDA places the control of minerals and petroleum in the South African 
state.9 One of the objectives of the MPRDA is to promote local and rural 
development and the social upliftment of communities affected by mining.10 
In ensuring this objective, the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) has 
an obligation to ensure that all mineral right applicants comply with the 
provisions of the MPRDA. Notwithstanding, there is an alarming number of 
disputes that appear before the courts, indicating that the DMR is failing to 
uphold the abovementioned objective. 
Against this background, the first section of the article briefly sets out the 
custodianship principle insofar as it relates to mineral and petroleum rights 
in South Africa.11 Thereafter, the judgement of Baleni v Minister of Mineral 
Resources12 is discussed to illustrate the inconsistent provisions of the 
MPRDA and the IPILRA. In the next section, the levels of engagement with 
community members as envisaged in terms of the respective Acts, namely 
consent and consultation, are analysed to determine whether they are in 
                                            
6  Pienaar Land Reform 167. There have been numerous failed attempts to promulgate 
communal land legislation in South Africa. In 1998 the Department of Land Affairs 
drafted the Land Rights Bill that was expected to go before Parliament by the end of 
1999 but never did. This Bill proposed a category of "protected rights" created by law 
to secure the basic rights of rural people in the former Bantustans. In 2001 the then 
Minister introduced a new bill named the Communal Land Rights Bill (GN 1423 in 
GG 23740 of 14 August 2002 (Communal Land Rights Bill, 2002), later the 
Communal Land Rights Bill B67-2003, in the conviction that the 1999 version would 
be demanding in its implementation. This 2002 version came about as a result of the 
frustration of different stakeholders who appealed that an adequate amount of time 
had not been allocated to give proper public commentary on the Bill. However, this 
version was also criticised heavily for confusing administrative structures. It was later 
re-drafted, but certain provisions were omitted. Thereafter, this version was rushed 
through Parliament without any meaningful contribution by those directly affected by 
it. At the time of writing, the latest attempt, the Communal Land Tenure Bill, 2017 
(Gen N 510 in GG 40965 of 7 July 2017) is awaiting Parliamentary approval. Also 
see Tlale Critical Evaluation of the South African Land Tenure Policy 99-100. 
7  Section 2(1) of the IPILRA is subject to s 2(4), which provides that a deprivation is 
effective only if it is prompted by valid expropriation legislation, or by custom, that is 
endorsed by a majority of the community members. 
8  Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA). 
9  Section 3 of the MPRDA provides that all mineral and petroleum resources are the 
heritage of all the people of South Africa and that the state is the custodian thereof. 
The control of minerals is thereby entrusted to the Department of Mineral Resources. 
10  Preamble to the MPRDA. 
11  The custodianship principle is discussed in 2 below. 
12  Baleni v Minister of Mineral Resources 2019 2 SA 453 (GP). 
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conflict with one another. This discussion will lead to an examination of the 
constitutional implications of the failure to conform to the proper procedure 
in mineral right applications. The final part of the article concludes and 
recommends possible ways forward in the mining communities' quagmire. 
2 The custodianship principle in South Africa 
Section 24 of the South African Constitution provides a basis upon which 
the MPRDA and other environmental legislation embody the custodianship 
principle.13 Section 24 further endows the relevant authorities with 
stewardship powers to facilitate the enjoyment of the environment by the 
present and future generations.14 This constitutional provision provides a 
basis upon which section 3 of the MPRDA vests the control of all rights in 
minerals in the state. Therefore, the state, through the Department of 
Mineral Resources (hereinafter the DMR), is the custodian of all mineral and 
petroleum resources "for the benefit of all South Africans".15 
Van der Schyff questions whether the MPRDA intentionally incorporated the 
custodianship principle in the South African law, and if so, what the legal 
implications of including such a notion are.16 In her enquiry she adopts 
custodianship as an exhibition of stewardship. She defines stewardship as 
"… the careful and responsible management of something entrusted to 
one's care".17 Accordingly, in the minerals context, the idea behind 
stewardship is for the state to hold and care for those minerals for the benefit 
of all South Africans.18 Inasmuch as it is the holder's responsibility to hold 
with care, everybody who interacts with the resource must observe the 
fiduciary relationship between the resource and the beneficiaries. This is 
                                            
13  The custodianship principle is also found in the National Environment Management 
Act 107 of 1998 (NEMA) and the National Environmental Management: Integrated 
Coastal Management Act 24 of 2008. See further Mostert and Pope Principles of the 
Law of Property 271. 
14  Van der Schyff has confirmed that the principles of custodianship and stewardship 
can be used interchangeably. Van der Schyff 2013 SALJ 373. 
15  Section 3(2)(a) MPRDA; De Beers Consolidated Mines v Regional Manager, Mineral 
Regulation Free State Region: DME 2008 ZAFSHC 40 (15 May 2008) para 6. 
16  Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA); Van der 
Schyff 2013 SALJ 373; Van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum 177. 
17  Van der Schyff 2013 SALJ 372; Van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum 
230; HTF Developer (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2007 
4 All SA 1108 (SCA) para 19; Legal Resources Centre 2016 https://bit.ly/2vYrCNu. 
18  Environmentalists use the stewardship concept often, as it is closely linked with 
sustainability and conservation. Bennett et al 2018 Environ Manage 598. Also see s 
1 of the MPRDA, which defines sustainable development as "the integration of 
social, economic and environmental factors into planning, implementation and 
decision-making so as to ensure that mineral and petroleum resources development 
serves current and future generations." 
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arguably the true essence of section 24 of the Constitution.19 The 
custodianship principle therefore sets a standard against which all the 
provisions of the MPRDA must be interpreted. The custodianship principle 
places a duty on the state to ensure that minerals and petroleum are used 
sustainably within the context of national environmental policies, norms and 
standards, while simultaneously promoting social and economic 
development for the benefit of society as a whole. In the performance of its 
role as a custodian, the state controls and issues rights and permits, and 
determines levies and fees incidental to the extraction of minerals and 
petroleum.20 
Although the benefits of mining are not the primary focus of this article, the 
discussion of the custodianship principle, which is purposed "for the benefit 
of all South Africans", has revealed the need to at least highlight them. In 
very general terms, mining activities benefit not only the community on 
which mining takes place but also the members therein and the country at 
large: 
(a) The mining community 
(i) Employment- is one of the key benefits that the community 
members and the community at large derive when a mine begins 
its activities.21 Over and above this, upon closure of the mine, the 
employees are left with skills they did not have before mining 
ensued. In addition to direct employment, beneficiation22 has the 
potential of contributing immensely to the South African 
economy. 
(ii)  Community development- through infrastructure, roads, 
installation of electricity and water, building of schools, clinics and 
other businesses.23 This in turn leads to reduced cost of living 
                                            
19  Van der Schyff 2013 SALJ 372; Winks 2013 https://bit.ly/30hisbr; Legal Resources 
Centre 2016 https://bit.ly/2vYrCNu. 
20  Section 3(2) of the MPRDA. 
21  Curtis 2009 https://cutt.ly/6yWokaG. 
22  Beneficiation is defined as the process of adding value from the granting of a mining 
right through to the final fabrication of a consumer branded product. This process 
ensures that labour is not exported from South Africa to other countries for the 
processing of metal that has been mined locally. Baxter 2005 
https://www.lbma.org.uk/assets/2c_baxter_lbma2005.pdf. 
23  Fedderke and Pirouz date unknown https://cutt.ly/qyWoaLZ; Curtis 2009 
https://cutt.ly/6yWokaG. 
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because the community members do not have to travel far to 
access these vital services.24 
(b) The nation, and impliedly, all South Africans 
(i) Revenue - When mining companies extract natural resources on 
community land, they pay revenue to the state. This revenue 
comes in different forms, namely bonuses, rents, royalties,25 or 
fees and penalties.26 Since mining accounts for up to 60% of 
exports in South Africa, this is vital for bringing cash into the 
country and translates into the overall development of South 
Africa.27 
(ii) International relations - It goes without saying that bonds are 
formed between exporters of minerals and the importing 
countries. These relations in turn create a space for South Africa 
and the importing countries to trade in other sectors of the 
economy outside mining.28 
(iii) Foreign investment - There are a number of determinant factors29 
to foreign investment, but mining attracts a lot of investment since 
it is one of the largest contributors to South Africa's gross 
domestic product.30 
All the above factors purportedly benefit all South Africans, since the money 
generated by mining goes into the state's purse. This is what the MPRDA 
intended by placing the minerals in the custody of the state. Although the 
custodianship principle is ideally meant to benefit all South African citizens, 
it has a somewhat opposite effect on customary landholders, especially if 
one considers the extent to which consultation is not readily part of the 
                                            
24  Fedderke and Pirouz date unknown https://cutt.ly/qyWoaLZ; Curtis 2009 
https://cutt.ly/6yWokaG. 
25  Sections 1 and 11 of the MPRDA. 
26  Section 99 of the MPRDA. 
27  In 2006 South Africa produced 53 different minerals from 1,212 mines and quarries, 
of which 47 produced gold, 33 platinum group minerals, 89 coal and 240 diamonds. 
Curtis 2009 https://cutt.ly/6yWokaG. 
28  Curtis 2009 https://cutt.ly/6yWokaG. 
29  Sound and secure land policies; clear, efficient and transparent investment 
regulations and stable fiscal regimes, among others. Vivoda "Determinants of 
Foreign Direct Investment in the Mining Industry" 22. 
30  Vivoda "Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in the Mining Industry" 25. 
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mineral right application process.31 This assertion is illustrated by case law 
below. 
3 Baleni v Department of Mineral Resources32 
Only a handful of cases have challenged the procedural aspects of the 
MPRDA in South Africa, yet these cases are sufficient to suggest that there 
are anomalies in the mineral rights application system. There are various 
reasons why many customary community grievances do not go as far as 
the national courts. Most notably, the customary communities often lack the 
financial muscle to challenge the rich, giant mining companies. The playing 
field is therefore not level. Nevertheless, the Xolobeni community did not 
shrink from fighting for their land rights against third parties who were 
awarded mineral rights without the community's consent. This case is a 
remarkable exhibition of conflicting levels of engagement in terms of the 
IPILRA and the MPRDA. 
3.1 Background facts 
The Xolobeni community is a village in Umgungundlovu area on the Wild 
Coast, Eastern Cape. Based on its location, the Xolobeni community 
(hereinafter the community) is administered in terms of customary law. In 
this matter, Duduzile Baleni represented the community in her capacity as 
the headwoman of the Umgungundlovu area. The community resisted 
mining activities on its land for over 10 years, starting from 2008.33 In 2008 
a mineral licence was awarded to an Australian company, Transworld 
Energy and Minerals (TEM). However, the community was neither notified 
nor consulted before the licence was awarded. During investigation, the 
community engaged in an unsatisfactory exchange of correspondence 
which culminated with the DMR’s maintaining its decision to grant mineral 
rights to TEM. The community lodged a number of internal appeals in an 
effort to resolve this matter, to no avail.34 In its final internal appeal, the 
community's major concern was that TEM had not obtained the requisite 
environmental and labour authorisations.35 The fact that this information 
                                            
31  See 4.4.1 on the discussion of the consultation procedure. 
32  Baleni v Minister of Mineral Resources 2019 2 SA 453 (GP) (hereinafter Baleni). 
33  The Amadiba Crises Committee (ACC) was created in 2007 in response to the 
anticipated significant changes to the traditional way of life brought about by the 
mining project. Anon 2018 https://bit.ly/2NhmdKq. 
34  The internal appeals were informed by s 96 of the MPRDA. Anon 2018 
https://bit.ly/2NhmdKq. 
35  According to s 37 of the MPRDA and s 2 of the NEMA a mining rights applicant must 
give effect to the approved environmental management programme and pay the 
prescribed retention fees. Also see s 48 of the National Environmental Management: 
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was missing implied that TEM had failed to consult in the manner prescribed 
by the MPRDA, since the community had not been given an opportunity to 
express any opinions about the proposed mining.36 
In 2015 TEM once again successfully applied for a mineral rights licence, 
but it was not able to comply with any consultation requirements because 
the community did not allow them access to the community property. 
Thereafter the DMR made a decision to block all mineral right applications 
for a period of 18 months (effective from June 2017).37 However, this did not 
resolve the community's objection to the granting of mineral rights licences 
on its land without its consent. Consequently, the community approached 
the North Gauteng High Court seeking an order declaring that: 
a) In terms of the IPILRA, consent is a precondition in a mineral rights 
application.38 
b) Compensation must be determined and paid before mineral rights can 
be exercised.39 
c) The MPRDA is unconstitutional insofar as it does not apply subject to 
the consent requirement under the IPILRA or prohibits the 
determination of compensation before mining activities take place.40 
                                            
Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 where mining will be allowed only if both the Minister 
of Environment, Forestry and Fisheries and Mineral Resources give written consent. 
Similarly, Regulation 46 of the MPRDA (GN R527 in GG 26275 of 23 April 2004) 
provides that a social labour plan must form part of the mining application 
documents. A social labour plan is the only way to ensure that the holders of mining 
or production rights contribute towards the socioeconomic development of the areas 
in which they are operating as well as the areas from which the majority of the 
workforce is sourced. Section 2(i) of the MPRDA. DMR 2010 https://bit.ly/2P3dVrM. 
36  The major concern was that TEM consulted only the local traditional leader and a 
few others around him. Anon 2018 https://bit.ly/2NhmdKq; See the consultation 
procedure in 4.1 below. 
37  GN 1014 in GG 40277 of 15 September 2016 (Prohibition or Restriction of 
Prospecting or Mining in terms of Section 49[1] of the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act, 2002 [Act No 28 of 2002]). 
38  Baleni paras 24 and 25. 
39  In regard to the claim for compensation, the applicants argued that as part of the 
discretion vested in the Minister in terms of s 23(2A) of the MPRDA (which section 
authorises the Minister to impose conditions on the award of the right when it is 
necessary to protect the community's interests), there should be a precondition that 
compensation should be determined before, as opposed to after, the granting of 
mineral rights. See Baleni para 46. 
40  Baleni para 27. 
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3.2 The issue before the court 
The central issue before the court was whether consent in terms of section 
2 of the IPILRA was required before a mineral right application is 
approved.41 According to section 2(1) of the IPILRA, no one may be 
deprived of any informal right to land without his or her consent. This 
provision is subject to subsection 2(4) of the IPILRA, the Expropriation Act, 
or any other law that provides for the expropriation of land or rights. In turn, 
subsection 2(4) of the IPILRA provides that it shall form part of the custom 
and usage of communities that the decision to dispose of informal land 
rights be taken by the majority of the right holders or their representatives. 
The right holders must therefore be given sufficient notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. For these 
reasons, the applicants (the Xolobeni community) relied heavily on this 
provision to substantiate their argument that mining activities could not 
ensue on their land without their consent.42 
Furthermore, the respondents (DMR, TEM and others) argued that the 
MPRDA clearly sets out that landowners or occupiers must be consulted, 
but they do not necessarily have to consent before mineral rights are 
awarded.43 To allow the community to consent, stated the respondents, 
would mean inserting unintended words into the MPRDA: consent comes 
into play only once the mineral right has been awarded and the 
implementation phase begins. The respondents further argued that it would 
create a bad precedent if customary communities seemed to have more 
rights than other common law owners in the same circumstances.44 In 
driving their point home, the respondents argued that the MPRDA trumps 
the IPILRA and this implies that no landowner can resist mining.45 Inasmuch 
as the DMR emphasised that consultation is the only required level of 
engagement, it failed to produce written proof of the consultation procedure 
from TEM.46 
In response, the applicants averred that the MPRDA provides for the 
granting of mineral rights, and that these mineral rights are land rights, as 
                                            
41  Baleni para 32. 
42  Baleni paras 24 and 25. 
43  Baleni para 26. 
44  Baleni para 27. 
45  Baleni para 26. 
46  The report from the Regional Manager indicated that "… notification and consultation 
with interested and affected parties have taken place and that no objection has been 
raised in respect of the application." 
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contemplated by section 2 of the IPILRA.47 In addition, that the MPRDA 
does not fall within the listed exceptions under section 2(4) of the IPILRA, 
namely that it is not the Expropriation Act or expropriation legislation,48 and 
the majority of the community had not agreed to dispose of their rights in 
land.49 To prove that a deprivation of property occurs when community land 
is awarded to third parties, the applicants argued that:  
a) Based on the First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v 
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services; First National 
Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance50 a deprivation 
had occurred since: 
… any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title 
or right to or in the property concerned.51 
Consequently, the applicants contended that a deprivation is present 
whenever the interference with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of 
property is significant enough to have a legally relevant impact on the 
rights of the affected party.52 They illustrated that if mining activities 
were allowed on their land, the activities would displace hundreds of 
                                            
47  Baleni para 71. 
48  The Constitutional Court has established that the granting of mineral rights does not 
constitute expropriation. See Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 
2012 5 SA 1 (SCA) paras 67-71. 
49  Baleni para 15. 
50  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (hereinafter FNB). 
51  FNB para 57. The definition in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 65 was considered where it was held that 
whether or not there had been a deprivation is a matter of degree and depends on 
the extent of the interference and "at the very least, substantial interference or 
limitation that goes beyond the normal restriction on property use or enjoyment ..." 
will be recognised as a deprivation of property. Van der Walt expresses the opinion 
that the decision in Mkontwana is an indication that the procedural fairness of a 
deprivation can be evaluated on a similar basis as the test for procedural fairness 
under administrative action. This implies that procedural arbitrariness under s 25(1) 
of the Constitution presumably closely resembles procedural fairness under ss 3 and 
4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). Van der Walt 2012 
Stell LR 89. See further Van der Sjide Reconsidering the Relationship between 
Property and Regulation 224-226. 
52  FNB para 100; Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 89; Van der Walt Constitutional Property 
Law 268. 
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community members, destroy and disrupt their culture, vegetation and 
water streams, and erode their livelihoods.53 
b) The applicants maintained that an award of a statutory mineral right in 
terms of the MPRDA satisfied the subtraction from the dominium test 
because section 5 of the MPRDA provides that a mineral right is a 
limited real right that stems from the landowner’s or occupiers' real 
rights.54 They maintained further that an award of a mineral right 
subtracts from a landowner's dominium,55 since it authorises the 
holder to engage in invasive activities on the land.56 In response, the 
respondents argued that the granting of a mineral right does not 
constitute a deprivation in the "traditional sense" since the MPRDA is 
a law envisaged by section 2(4) of the IPILRA and is therefore a valid 
exception to section 2(1) and therefore automatically excludes the 
consent requirement.57 
                                            
53  Baleni paras 11, 12, and 59. See also Daniels v Scribante 2017 4 SA 341 (CC) para 
2; Maledu v Itireleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Ltd 2018 ZACC 41 (25 
October 2018) (hereinafter Maledu). 
54  See s 2 of the MPRDA, where the nature of the custodianship principle is discussed. 
55  In Ex Parte Geldenhuys 1926 OPD 155 it was held that a condition in a will to pay a 
sum of money to other beneficiaries did not amount to a real right that could be 
registered in the deeds registry. Similarly, in Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 SA 1044 (T) 
1052D the issue was whether the condition (already registered), which laid down the 
obligation to pay a sum of money to someone, amounted to a subtraction from the 
dominium. The court found that the condition amounted to a subtraction in a sense 
that the parties intended to establish it, but the obligation did not affect the use and 
enjoyment of the land in the "physical sense" and could therefore not be a real right. 
Pearly Beach Trust v Registrar of Deeds 1990 4 SA 614 (C) in turn confirmed that 
the payment of money to a third party amounted to a limited real right because it 
placed a burden on what the owner could do with his/her property. More recently, in 
Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka 2015 5 SA 304 (SCA) the 
issues for determination were whether a condition of title in a title deed of immovable 
property which prohibited the transfer thereof without a clearance certificate or the 
consent of a homeowner's association constituted a real or personal right. Similarly, 
the court had to decide whether the embargo remained binding on the Master and 
trustees of the property owners in sequestration. The court relied on Cape 
Explosives Ltd v Denel (Pty) Ltd 2001 3 SA 578 (SCA) and Lorentz v Melle 1978 3 
SA 1044 (T) to conclude that the right created by the embargo is a personal right 
that does not subtract from the dominium of the property. 
56  This argument fails to acknowledge that the limited real right status of prospecting 
and mining rights remains a limited real right even when it is the landowner himself 
who extracts the minerals. Prospecting and mining rights are rights sui generis in 
that, once severed from the ground, they are separated from the ownership of the 
land. This characteristic makes them different from the traditional limited real rights 
because an owner cannot possess limited real rights in his/her own property. 
Badenhorst 2017 SALJ 363; Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Law of 
Property 332; Van der Schyff Property in Minerals and Petroleum 328-330. 
57  Baleni para 26. 
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3.3 Decision of the court 
In this ground-breaking decision, the North Gauteng High Court noted with 
caution that many communities in South Africa, such as the Xolobeni, 
continue to face issues with mining companies and the DMR.58 For this 
reason the declaratory orders were granted as sought. It was important for 
the court to declare that the Xolobeni community was indeed a "community" 
in terms of section 1 of the IPILRA. Being recognised as such implied that 
the community was the lawful landholder. Basson J particularly emphasised 
that the Minister of the DMR lacked authority to grant mineral rights unless 
the relevant provisions of the IPILRA had been complied with.59 The court 
professed that, in terms of section 2(1) of the IPILRA, the DMR was obliged 
to obtain full and informed consent from the community before granting any 
mineral rights to TEM.60 
The court also found that a deprivation had occurred under both section 2(1) 
of the IPILRA and section 25(1) of the Constitution.61 This decision has 
therefore set the standard of consent, as opposed to consultation, in the 
award of mineral applications. It also illustrates how the DMR occasionally 
allows mineral right applicants to circumvent certain legislative provisions in 
favour of the MPRDA. Unfortunately, whether aware or not of the mineral 
applicant's misdemeanours, the DMR will be held accountable for its 
decisions to award licences without due regard for the correct legislative 
procedures. 
One would expect that the DMR as the custodian of mineral resources 
would celebrate this trailblazing decision. As illustrated in Part 2 of this 
paper, a custodian holds something with care for another's benefit. In this 
case, mineral rights are protected to benefit South African citizens, 
predominantly those who are victims of historical discrimination.62 However, 
despite the positive outcome in this case, the DMR intends to appeal against 
                                            
58  Maledu; Baleni; Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 113 (CC); Meepo v Kotze 2008 1 SA 104 (NC) para 13 etc. 
59  Baleni para 84. 
60  It is unclear whether Basson J appreciated that the DMR is not a party to the 
consultation or consent proceedings. The DMR's role is to ensure that consultation 
by an applicant meets the required standard under the MPRDA. S 27(5)(b) of the 
MPRDA provides that a mining applicant must notify in writing and consult with the 
land owner and submit the result of the said consultation within 30 days from the 
date of the notice. 
61  Baleni para 59. 
62  Baleni para 40. 
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this decision, claiming that it usurps the authority to issue mineral licences 
from the state to communities, and that this will "create chaos".63 
The next part of the article attempts to reconcile the different levels of 
engagement under the IPILRA and the MPRDA, consent and consultation 
respectively. Although the courts have omitted to divulge how this can be 
done, it has been accepted that the two statutes must be read together.64 
4 Legislative approaches to the consent and consultation 
principles 
4.1 Consultation and consent 
Several policies and legislation that govern the extraction of minerals aim to 
attract enormous investments to the detriment of local communities, and 
this brings about serious social and economic challenges.65 The Xolobeni 
community refused to allow mining on their land because it is home to 
several hundred people and because the land is an important resource, 
central to the livelihoods and substance of the community members.66 
Among other uses, the land is utilised for livestock and the cultivation of 
crops. A significant number of the community members rely on tourism and 
tourist-related activities which take place within the proposed mining area. 
Accordingly, the proposed mining activity has a potential to deter investment 
in tourism and eco-tourism, which are contingent upon the preservation of 
the area's natural beauty and ecological diversity.67 
4.1.1 Consultation 
The MPRDA provides that applicants for mineral rights are not required to 
obtain consent from the occupiers of the land who could potentially be 
                                            
63  This statement was made at the 25th Mining Indaba held in Cape Town, in February 
2019. Soon after the decision in Baleni was laid down, the Minister attempted to 
engage with the Xolobeni community on several occasions, under the guise of 
further discussions on integrated and sustainable economic development in the 
community, but the community was not interested in anything the Minister had to 
say. His last visit to Xolobeni in January 2019 was interrupted by community 
demonstrations. The DMR has since announced the imminent commencement of an 
independent survey to determine whether mining should go ahead in Xolobeni. The 
survey is said to be in line with one of the outcomes of the court judgment. In April 
2019 the community resisted the Minister's visit on the grounds that there was no 
basis for the visit while an appeal was pending against them. 
64  Baleni para 40. 
65  Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC) para 39. 
66  Baleni para 12. 
67  Baleni para 12. 
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affected by the mining. Instead, the mineral right applicants must consult 
with the land occupiers to the satisfaction of the DMR. Consultation is 
defined as taking advice and seeking information. It does not imply reaching 
an agreement.68 Froneman J accurately summed up the purpose of 
consultation as being: 
… to determine if it is possible for a landowner to accommodate the applicant 
of a prospecting right and the landowner insofar as the interference of the use 
of their property is concerned.69 
For instance, in Bengwenyama Ye-Maswazi Pty Ltd, v Genorah Resources 
(Pty) Ltd70 (hereinafter Bengwenyama v Genorah) it was established that, 
for consultation to be meaningful, the following factors must be established: 
(a) The landowner must be informed about the mineral right application in 
relation to his/her land. Although the court did not set out a clear 
procedure for effecting this mandate, the landowner must actually be 
aware that there is a pending application before the DMR. 
(b) The applicant of a mining right must provide the landowner with 
enough information regarding the mining. This information should not 
be superficial but must actually inform the landowner of how the mining 
will affect him/her.71 
(c) Consultation should be done in good faith. This requires that the 
mineral right applicants should recognise and be prepared to deal with 
the negative impact that the mining activities will have on the land. An 
agreement must be reached on the best way to manage the 
anticipated disruptions on a landowner's property. 
                                            
68  Metal and Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd 1985 6 ILJ 478 (IC); Residents of Joe 
Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 
237. Also see Meepo v Kotze 2008 1 SA 104 (NC) (para 13), where it was held that 
the purpose of consultation under the MPRDA is to alleviate possible serious inroads 
being made on the property right of the landowner. 
69  Walsh "Evolving Relationship between Property and Participation" 264. Walsh 
argues that owners and interest-holders must be given "a voice" in decision-making 
processes that affect their property. In this way, the decision-makers are forced to 
consider possible competing claims to the entitlement and decide what regulatory 
measure would strike the appropriate balance between the private and the public 
interest. In the process, these participation rights become a source of potential 
protection for property rights as well as other property interests. Also see Van der 
Sjide Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and Regulation 232. 
70  Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 
(CC) (Bengwenyama). 
71  This stage involves even the smallest details like the drilling of holes, their position, 
the operation times and the anticipated pollution (noise, water etc) on the land. 
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Over and above these factors, for consultation to be judicious the 
communities must be furnished with full details about what the mining 
entails. For instance, how and when it will happen as well as what its impact 
on the land will be.72 The Constitutional Court confirmed this position in the 
case of Bengwenyama v Genorah, where it was decided that mining 
companies must provide potential mining communities with full information 
about mining and its potential impact on the land and how it will affect the 
community members. This is to say that the mining company should not 
simply try to obtain signatures to confirm that a community does not object 
to mining, since the consultation process is not just about ticking boxes. 
Therefore, all the necessary information must be furnished and the mining 
company must pay attention to the concerns raised by communities and 
respond accordingly. Thus, if the mining company fails to provide this 
information, they are deemed not to have consulted. Equally, giving false 
information while consulting is a punishable criminal offence under the 
MPRDA.73 
The case of Doe Run Exploration SA (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and 
Energy74 (hereinafter Doe Run) further illustrates the critical role that the 
consultation exercise plays before prospecting for minerals begins. In this 
case the applicant, a registered South African mining exploration company, 
applied for prospecting rights from the DMR but the application was denied. 
The applicant was later informed that their application had been approved 
but only in respect of a portion of the property. The issue before the court 
therefore was whether the prospecting right applicant had failed to notify 
and consult the landowner or occupier about their application at the DMR in 
terms of section 16(4) of the MPRDA. This section provides that upon 
acceptance of the application for prospecting rights, the Regional Manager 
must notify the successful applicant to submit an environmental 
management plan and also notify and consult with the landowner, in writing. 
As a consequence, the company failed to furnish proof of the notification or 
the consultation proof as required. The court held that this provision is 
                                            
72  Before a company starts mining, it must prepare a social and labour plan. A social 
labour plan contains information about employment opportunities and the steps the 
company will take to develop the skills of mineworkers. It may also include 
infrastructure development and poverty eradication projects (beneficiation). DMR 
2010 https://bit.ly/2P3dVrM. 
73  Section 98(b) of the MPRDA; Badenhorst 2016 SALJ 39. 
74  Doe Run Exploration SA (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2008 ZANCHC 
3 (8 February 2008) (hereinafter Doe Run). 
MT TLALE  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  16 
peremptory, since the notification and consultation procedure is meant to 
protect the land occupiers' rights.75 
4.1.1.1 The consultation procedure in mineral right applications 
The abovementioned cases are indicative of how crucial the consultation 
procedure is in mineral right applications. In terms of section 22(1) of the 
MPRDA, an applicant for a mineral right must lodge an application at the 
office of the Regional Manager in whose region the land is situated. If the 
Regional Manager is satisfied that all the requirements have been met, and 
that there are no simultaneous mineral right applications in respect of the 
same land, he must accept the application.76 Within 14 days of the 
acceptance of a mineral right application, the Regional Manager must then 
notify the applicant to submit an environmental management plan.77 By the 
same token, it is the Regional Manager's duty to instruct the applicant to 
"notify and consult" with the land occupiers or any other affected persons. 
The results of this notification and consultation must be submitted within 30 
days from the date of the notice.78 
As shown by the case law above,79 during this notification and consultation 
process the applicant is required to inform the landowner or occupier in 
sufficient detail of what the mining activities will entail, to allow the latter the 
opportunity to determine the impact of the mining on his land.80 Should there 
be any objections from the land occupiers, the Regional Manager must 
inform the Regional Mining Development and Environmental Committee.81 
In addition to the notification and consultation process above, land 
occupiers have another opportunity at a mandatory consultation 
subsequent to the award of the mineral right licence, but just before the 
mining activities begin. This second consultation should be about how the 
successful applicant will access the land and how the land occupiers will be 
                                            
75  Doe Run para 39. 
76  Section 22(2)(a)-(b) of the MPRDA. If the application requirements fall short, the RM 
must notify the applicants in writing within 14 days of the application informing them 
of the outcome. S 22(3) of the MPRDA. 
77  Section 22(4)(a) of the MPRDA; Bengwenyama para 62. The notice must be 
published in either (i) the provincial Gazette, (ii) the magistrate's court or (iii) a local 
or national newspaper circulating in the area where the land to which the application 
relates is situated. 
78  Section 2(4)(b) of the MPRDA. 
79  Bengwenyama and Doe Run. 
80  Sections 10(1) and 22(4) of the MPRDA; See Baleni para 15; Also see 
Bengwenyama para 67. 
81  The MPRDA is silent on what should happen after the Committee advises the RM 
and what factors must be taken into account when an objection to mining is under 
internal review. 
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compensated. These are actually two separate opportunities to be 
consulted, but in practice mining companies often consult only once.82 
Inasmuch as the "consent" factor that was available in the previous mining 
legislation83 has been rescinded under the MPRDA, this does not in any 
way imply that the consultation requirement has been discarded with it. 
In a nutshell, consultation provides land occupiers with the necessary 
information about all the activities that will take place on the land. This 
enables them to make an informed decision in relation to the 
representations to be made. On this basis, the consultation process and its 
outcomes are fundamental in determining fairness or the lack thereof, 
because the decision to accept or refuse a mineral right application by the 
DMR cannot be reasonable if there are insufficient details in the consultation 
process.84 Therefore, the different notice and consultation requirements are 
indicative of a serious concern for the rights and interests of land occupiers 
in the process of granting mineral rights, since the granting and execution 
of these rights represent a considerable intrusion on the use and enjoyment 
of one's land.85 
4.1.2 Consent 
Under common law, a mining right could be acquired only by concluding a 
contract with the landowner, which presupposed negotiation and reaching 
an agreement on the terms of the contract.86 A central element of free, prior 
and informed consent87 in the mining context is genuine inclusion, 
disclosure, and respect for peoples' decision-making processes. The right 
                                            
82  Section 54(3) of the MPRDA; Bengwenyama para 62. 
83  Section 5 of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (repealed). 
84  This is important in determining whether the consultation was sufficient to render the 
grant of the application procedurally (un)fair. 
85  Bengwenyama para 65. 
86  The common law principle of the cuius est solum principle states that the property 
owners own everything above and below the ground. This principle was transplanted 
into section 5 of the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (repealed); Bradbrook 1988 Adel L Rev 
464; Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri South Africa 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA); 
Bengwenyama para 65; Baleni para 34. 
87  Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) is a specific right that pertains to indigenous 
peoples and is recognised in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (2007) (UNDRIP). Consent is free if it is given voluntarily and 
without coercion, intimidation or manipulation. It must be sought sufficiently in 
advance of any authorisation or commencement of activities. Consent is informed 
when the nature of the engagement and type of information is provided before 
seeking consent and as part of the ongoing consent process. Once given, consent 
can be withdrawn at any stage. Therefore, FPIC enables the indigenous peoples to 
negotiate the conditions under which the project will be designed, implemented, 
monitored and evaluated. Portalewska 2012 https://bit.ly/2Nh9uY6. 
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to free, prior and informed consent is protected by a number of international 
instruments, to all of which South Africa is a signatory. These include but 
are not limited to the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination,88 the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights,89 the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,90 and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights.91 
Collectively, these instruments call on State parties to: 
… ensure that members of indigenous peoples have equal rights in respect of 
effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to 
their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.92 
As a result, these instruments place great value on the public partaking in 
decisions that affect them, not only as citizens of the state, but also as a 
special category of customary (or indigenous) right holders. The consent 
aspect of this section will be described in terms of the practical example of 
the MPRDA and the IPILRA to elucidate that a reconciliation of the MPRDA 
and other statutes is possible. 
4.2 IPILRA vs MPRDA 
The Constitution, the MPRDA and the IPILRA collectively recognise the 
need to rectify the injustices of the past racial laws. Despite this noble 
objective, the MPRDA enables mineral right holders to mine for minerals on 
community land without the community members’ consent.93 As discussed 
earlier, section 2(1) of the IPILRA provides that no person may be deprived 
of any informal right to land without his or her consent. This provision is 
subject to section 2(4) of the IPILRA, the Expropriation Act94 or any other 
law that provides for the expropriation of land or rights in land. Accordingly, 
section 2(4) provides that it shall form part of the custom and usage of 
communities that the decision to dispose of informal rights in land is taken 
by the majority of the right holders or their representatives. The right holders 
must be given sufficient notice and a reasonable opportunity to participate 
                                            
88  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(1965). 
89  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
90  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). 
91  African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981). 
92  Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination General Recommendation 23: 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples UN Doc A/52/18 (1997). 
93  The acceptable level of engagement in terms of the MPRDA is consultation. 
94  Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
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in the decision-making process. In such a case, appropriate compensation 
shall be payable to any person so deprived.95 
Cousins believes that if the MPRDA is applied subject to the IPILRA, the 
consent requirement would be a prerequisite in all mineral right 
applications.96 In this way, communities could select which activities to allow 
on their land and which to decline.97 Although the state's custodianship of 
mineral rights seems to be diminishing the landowners' control over their 
property, the MPRDA is not intended to trump all other rights and interests 
in land.98 
For example, the Constitutional Court in Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape 
Town99 decided that the application of the MPRDA does not override other 
statutes. In this case, the issue before the court was whether a holder of a 
mineral right could exercise mineral rights in an area where the Land Use 
Planning Ordinance (LUPO) was applicable, without getting a permit from 
the City of Cape Town. Confirming the decisions of the courts a quo,100 the 
Constitutional Court held that it was wrong to assume that the DMR 
possessed overriding powers against other government authorities.101 This 
decision infers that LUPO and the MPRDA can and should operate 
alongside each other.102 Reading LUPO and the MPRDA together creates 
                                            
95  Section 2(3) of the IPILRA. 
96  Cousins 2018 https://bit.ly/33JuNHv. The High Level report has made 
recommendations that the MPRDA must be amended in order to force mining 
companies to comply with IPILRA as a pre-condition for the grant of mining-related 
rights. Mothlanthe Commission 2017 https://bit.ly/2TK7oRs 502. Some scholars 
believe that making IPILRA permanent would strengthen the customary 
communities' position. Its permanence is expected to reinforce its legal and practical 
protection of informal rights while also raising its awareness and strengthening its 
enforcement mechanisms. However, this argument fails to consider that despite its 
"interim status", the IPILRA is an Act of Parliament and therefore already has a force 
similar to that of permanent legislation. 
97  Mothlanthe Commission 2017 https://bit.ly/2TK7oRs; Cousins 2018 
https://bit.ly/33JuNHv. 
98  Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC) para 17; s 16 of the 
Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (LUPO). 
99  Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC) (hereinafter 
Maccsand). 
100  In the High Court decision (City of Cape Town v Maccsand (Pty) Ltd 2010 6 SA 63 
(WCC). Maccsand was interdicted from commencing or continuing with mining 
operations on the property in question unless and until the provisions of LUPO and 
NEMA had been complied with. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Appeal (Maccsand 
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2011 6 SA 633 (SCA)) held that the MPRDA and 
LUPO must operate alongside each other because they have different objects and 
each did not purport to serve the purpose of the other. As a result, there was no merit 
in the assertion that LUPO would usurp the functions of the MPRDA. 
101  Baleni para 40; Maccsand para 51. Also see Maledu para 5. 
102  Baleni para 40; Maccsand para 51. Also see Maledu para 5. 
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the expectation that the MPRDA and the IPILRA can potentially be read in 
conjunction with each other. This would mean that the communities would 
have to be consulted under the MPRDA, but they would first have to consent 
to the mining in terms of the IPILRA.103 
The case of Maledu v Itireleng-Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Limited104 
has particularly reinforced the position that the MPRDA must be read in 
conjunction with the IPILRA. In this case, the issue was whether the 
applicants had consented to being deprived of their informal rights in land 
under section 2(1) of the IPILRA. In arriving at the conclusion that the 
respondents (DMR and Itireleng-Bakgatla) had no right to evict the 
applicants, the court noted that the existence of a mineral right does not in 
itself extinguish the rights of a landowner or occupier.105 Therefore, the 
cases of Baleni v Minister of Mineral Resources, Maledu v Itireleng-Bakgatla 
as well as Maccsand v City of Cape Town have strengthened the legal 
position that an alliance of the MPRDA and other legislation is not only 
constructive but it is also practical. The next section illustrates the potential 
constitutional consequences of failing to consult and obtain consent from 
land occupiers as required by legislation and case law. 
5 Constitutional consequences of non-conformity with the 
consultation procedure 
5.1 Administrative action 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act106 (PAJA) was promulgated to 
give effect to section 33 of the Constitution.107 Section 33(1) provides that 
everyone has a right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. Against this constitutional background, section 1(a) of the 
PAJA defines administrative action as any decision taken or failure to take 
a decision by an organ of state while exercising a power or performing a 
public function authorised by any legislation. This decision must adversely 
affect the rights of any person and must have a direct and external legal 
                                            
103  Maledu para 103. Also see Baleni para 28. 
104  Maledu v Itireleng Bakgatla Mineral Resources (Pty) Ltd 2018 ZACC 41 (25 October 
2018). 
105  Maledu para 103. 
106  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). 
107  In terms of s 33(1) of PAJA, everyone has a right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Similarly, anyone whose rights have been 
adversely affected by an administrative action has a right to be given reasons in 
writing. 
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effect to qualify as an "administrative decision".108 Accordingly, the 
Constitutional Court109 has identified the seven distinct elements of 
administrative action as follows: (a) A decision; (b) by an organ of state; (c) 
exercising a public power or performing a public function; (d) in terms of 
legislation; (e) that adversely affects rights; (f) that has a direct, external 
legal effect; (g) and does not fall under any of the listed exclusions.110 
As a result, if the abovementioned elements are applied in the context of 
the Xolobeni community, this would mean that: 
(a) A decision; (b) by the DMR through the Regional Manager; (c) to grant 
a mineral right licence without any kind of proof of consultation; (d) in terms 
of section 22 of the MPRDA; (e) could interfere with the lives and livelihoods 
of members of the community; (f) and could amount to arbitrary deprivation 
of property; and (g) does not fall under the exceptions listed under section 
1(aa)-(ii) of PAJA. 
Under normal circumstances it is enough to show the presence of 
administrative action and claim remedies under section 8 of the PAJA. 
However, to strengthen their case the Xolobeni community could go further 
to show the severity of the breach of their administrative rights. In terms of 
section 4 of the PAJA, where an administrative action materially and 
adversely affects the rights of the public, the administrator must decide 
whether to hold a public enquiry,111 to follow a notice and comment 
procedure,112 or to follow a procedure that is fair but different.113 These 
measures are available to ensure that effect is given to the right to a 
procedurally fair administrative action.114 Similarly, section 6(1) of the PAJA 
also recognises that any administrative processes taken in terms of the 
MPRDA must be timeous, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
                                            
108  Section 1 of PAJA; Hoexter Administrative Law 197; s 6 of the MPRDA provides that 
any administrative process conducted or decision taken in terms of the MPRDA must 
be conducted or taken within a reasonable time and in accordance with the principles 
of lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness (italics added). 
109  Hoexter Administrative Law 197; Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau 
2014 5 SA 69 (CC) para 33. 
110  Hoexter Administrative Law 197; Quinot Administrative Justice 78. 
111  Section 4(1)(a) of the PAJA. 
112  Section 4(1)(b) of the PAJA. 
113  Section 4(1)(d) of the PAJA. 
114  Hoexter Administrative Law 197; Quinot Administrative Justice 78. Three elements 
that flow from the procedural fairness provision are that it (a) affects any person (or 
public); (b) has material and adverse effects; and (c) affects rights or legitimate 
expectations. 
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Based on the standard of consultation set by case law and sections 10, 22 
and 27 of the MPRDA as analysed above, it can be inferred that the 
consultation measures set therein were not followed in the Baleni case. It 
must therefore be determined whether the decision to grant a mineral rights 
licence by the DMR, without proof of meaningful consultation by TEM, was 
procedurally fair to the community. Van der Sjide asserts that procedural 
fairness plays two vital roles in realising a variety of constitutional objectives 
and improving administrative decision-making in general.115 
a) Firstly, it has the potential of ensuring that all relevant 
considerations are brought to the attention of the administrator 
before a decision is made. 
b) Secondly, having proper regard to the link between procedural 
fairness, especially participation, and the dignity of persons who 
stand to be affected by the decision can encourage the 
development of a rich concept of procedural fairness in the hope 
of realising the ideal of administrative justice and supporting other 
constitutional rights and values.116 
If all these factors are applied to the Xolobeni community dispute, it is 
apparent that the Minister's decision to grant the mineral rights licence to 
TEM was procedurally unfair because he was authorised to act as an 
administrator, but failed to comply with the mandatory and material 
procedure set out in the MPRDA. This renders his decision procedurally 
unfair, because the community was not in a position to make a decision 
about the proposed mining. Hence, a decision that could clearly affect the 
community materially was made without them. 
Accordingly, section 6(2)(b) of the PAJA authorises any persons to institute 
proceedings in a court if a mandatory and material procedure or condition 
prescribed by the empowering provision was not complied with. In this 
situation the court can grant any order that is just and equitable, prohibit the 
administrator from acting in a particular manner,117 set aside the 
administrative action,118 declare the rights of the parties,119 or in exceptional 
                                            
115  Van der Sjide Reconsidering the Relationship between Property and Regulation 221; 
Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 89; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 268-269. 
116  Mostly applicable in the realisation of socio-economic rights. For instance, the right 
of access to adequate housing under s 26 of the Constitution. 
117  Section 8(1)(b) of the PAJA. 
118  Section 8(1)(c) of the PAJA. 
119  Section 8(1)(d) of the PAJA. 
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circumstances direct the administrator to pay compensation.120 As a result, 
these options were available to the Xolobeni community but were 
unfortunately not explored during the court case. 
5.2 The right to property 
In terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution, no one may be deprived of 
property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit the arbitrary deprivation of property.121 Likewise, section 2(1) of the 
IPILRA provides that no person may be deprived of any informal right to 
land without his or her consent.122 Informal rights in land are defined as the 
use, occupation or access to land in terms of any tribal, customary or 
indigenous law or practice of a tribe.123 The Xolobeni community identifies 
as a community as envisioned by section 1 of the IPILRA. Therefore, their 
informal rights in land are "property" for the purposes of section 25 of the 
Constitution. 
The courts in Baleni and other v Minister of Mineral Resources and Maledu 
v Itireleng-Bakgatla cases, as discussed in section 4, accepted the 
definitions of deprivation as demonstrated in First National Bank of South 
Africa Ltd t/a Wesbank (FNB) v Minister of Finance124 and Mkontwana v 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality.125 FNB defines deprivation as 
"any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private 
property".126 Mkontwana adds that whether or not there has been a 
deprivation is a matter of degree and depends on the extent of the 
interference and 
                                            
120  Section 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of the PAJA. 
121  Section 25(1) of the Constitution closely resembles s 2(1) of the IPILRA, at least in 
a legal sense. These sections are both to the effect that deprivations of property are 
not valid unless effected in terms of law of general application, which does not permit 
arbitrary deprivations. 
122  Section 2(1) of the IPILRA is subject to s 2(4) of the IPILRA, which provides that the 
decision to dispose of informal rights in land must taken by the majority of the right 
holders or their representatives and that this shall form part of the custom and usage 
of communities. The right holders must be given sufficient notice and a reasonable 
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. 
123  Section 1(1)(i) of the IPILRA; Baleni paras 54-56; Maledu paras 60-61. 
124  First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Commissioner for the South African 
Revenue Services; First National Bank of SA Limited t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (hereinafter FNB). 
125  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC). 
126  FNB para 57; Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 89; also see Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 264-270 and Van der Sjide Reconsidering the Relationship between 
Property and Regulation 224-226. 
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… at the very least, substantial interference or limitation that goes beyond the 
normal restrictions on property use, or enjoyment found in an open democratic 
society.127 
The case of Maledu v Itireleng-Bakgatla used the Oxford dictionary 
definition of deprivation to elucidate it as "the damaging lack of basic 
material benefits or lack or denial of something considered essential."128 
Therefore, applied in the mineral rights context, the central issue in the 
abovementioned cases was whether an award of mineral rights constituted 
a deprivation of informal rights in land. The applicants in Baleni argued that 
they were being deprived of their property rights because there was no legal 
justification for the loss of their property. They based this claim on the 
argument that the MPRDA did not fall within any of the listed exceptions 
under section 2(4) of the IPILRA.129 In arriving at the decision that a grant 
of mineral rights amounted to a deprivation of property, the Constitutional 
Court in Maledu articulated that: 
… given the invasive nature of a mining right, there can be no denying that 
when exercising her rights, the mining right holder, would intrude into the 
rights of the owner of the land to which the mining right relates. The more 
invasive the mining operations are the greater the extent of subtraction from 
a landowner's dominium will it entail.130 
Therefore, case law has rightly established that whenever applicants apply 
for mineral rights they must produce written evidence of consultation and 
they must further obtain consent from the land occupiers since mining 
activities interrupt an occupier's enjoyment of their property. This goes a 
long way towards securing informal customary land rights in South Africa. 
In these circumstances, I argue that consent and consultation are not 
mutually exclusive since one cannot consent to something unless one has 
been consulted. 
Therefore, the DMR is always under an obligation to ensure that mineral 
right applicants comply with the legislative standards of consultation before 
they can approve mineral right applications. This is because failure to do so 
opens the door to liability insofar as administrative and property rights are 
concerned. Although the DMR is not a party to the consultation process, it 
must ensure that all the requirements of the MPRDA are met.131 Section 22 
requires that proper consultation must be in writing: This was the missing 
                                            
127  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality 2005 1 SA 530 (CC) para 
65. 
128  Maledu para 98-99. 
129  Exceptions to the consent requirement are analysed in 4.2 above. 
130  Maledu para 102; Baleni para 102. 
131  See 4.1.1.1 above. 
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link in the case of Baleni. TEM claimed to have consulted in terms of section 
22(4) of the MPRDA but still failed to produce any kind of proof of that 
consultation. 
6 Conclusion 
One of the Constitution's primary roles is to redress the injustices of the past 
that left Black people without land and secure tenure over it. The 
implementation of this objective is facilitated by various pieces of legislation 
that seek to secure the land tenure of previously dispossessed people. One 
such piece of legislation is the IPILRA, which was enacted to secure 
informal land rights. Nonetheless, the custodianship principle under section 
3 of the MPRDA somewhat undermines the IPILRA by failing to involve the 
customary land occupiers before mineral rights are granted. Although the 
DMR holds mineral rights on behalf of and for the benefit of all South 
Africans, it exacerbates the already insecure land tenure rights of customary 
communities by enabling mineral right applicants to by-pass the 
consultation requirements of the MPRDA. 
In balancing the economic rights of mining against land tenure security, the 
courts have decided in favour of the latter. Notwithstanding, the DMR can 
still be held liable for its failure to act as a true custodian of mineral rights. 
The DMR acted negligently by awarding mineral rights without proof that 
consultation as required by the MPRDA had taken place. This (in)action by 
the DMR led to its liability for the potential loss of property rights and, as 
argued in this article, this inaction can be extended further to liability for a 
breach of administrative rights. 
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